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Abstract 
 
Since the 1980s, developing countries started adopting telecom reforms due to pressures from 
international institutions. However, Middle East and North African (MENA) countries lagged in 
adopting such reforms. Even after introducing telecom reforms in the MENA region beginning in 1995, 
not all countries became better off in terms of various performance indicators. Therefore, this paper 
empirically assesses the effects of regulation, privatization and liberalization reforms, as well as their 
simultaneous presences, in the telecommunication sector on the sector's performance using a sample of 
17 MENA countries for the period 1995-2010. We assume that different reforms are affected by 
institutional, political and economic variables with respect to the level of democracy, the legal origin, 
the natural resources rents per country and the year of independence from colonization. We correct for 
the endogeneity of telecom reforms, and we use IV-2SLS (Instrumental Variable-Two Stages Least 
Squares) estimation to analyze their effect on telecom performance in terms of access, productivity and 
affordability. We find that the privatization of the main incumbent operator and the fixed-line market’s 
liberalization affect the sector's performance negatively in terms of fixed access and affordability. 
Moreover, we find that the simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and a privatized 
incumbent helps to eliminate the drawbacks on the sector performance resulting from privatization. 
However, the simultaneous presences of the other reforms in terms of regulation-competition and 
privatization-fixed competition do not help to improve the sector's performance. 
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2 
1. Introduction 
 
The telecommunication sector widely developed across the world beginning in the 1980s thanks to 
technological, institutional, regulatory and demand-side developments. The telecommunication industry 
is regarded as the most economically significant and politically sensitive industry being privatized in the 
world today (Bortolotti et al. 2002). After 1990, the regulatory framework had largely evolved, and 
many countries opened their sector to competition. At the current stage of development of the 
telecommunication sector, it is still concerned with issues related to the triptych “regulation (re-
regulation), privatization and liberalization” (Joskow 2007). Given these three telecommunication 
reforms, policymakers need to identify the best practice by which to reform the telecommunication 
sector, which should be analyzed within the institutional and political contexts of the countries studied. 
Although the regulatory framework of the telecommunication industry has changed radically since the 
1980s, much remains to be accomplished, especially in developing countries. This paper shows that the 
adoption of such reforms in a group of developing countries, under WB and IMF recommendations, 
does not guarantee the development of an efficient sector. As stated by Laffont (2005), the advisers 
repeated the percepts designed for developed countries while they paid little attention to the unique 
characteristics of the developing countries. Such characteristics include the inefficiency of their tax 
systems, their inability to audit costs, their inefficient credit markets, their widespread corruption, their 
inability to enter into long-term contracts with continuous renegotiations, the weakness they experience 
in administering the rule of law and their poor enforcement of laws and contracts. All of these 
characteristics are likely to harden the government's investment in the infrastructure, to affect the cost of 
public intervention, specifically in terms of regulation and competition policy and to make it difficult to 
attract the foreign capital that is necessary for the sector's development (Laffont 2005). 
In the developing world, the telecom sector was the first infrastructure sector to be subject to major 
reforms, followed by the electricity sector. Such reforms were justified by its low performance, lack of 
investments and major inefficiencies. In addition, the aim of such reforms was to increase the 
investment level in the sector by giving investors more guarantees for operating in the market (Spiller 
1993). Due to pressures from international institutions, mainly from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB), developing countries have privatized their state-owned incumbent 
operators, allowing the entry of foreign and domestic operators to increase competition and establishing 
independent regulatory institutions. However, liberalization and deregulation failed to attract local or 
foreign investment. 
Although there is a large movement toward regulatory reform in developing countries, the timing 
and features of the telecom reforms differ relatively across such countries. Since the 1980s, most 
developing countries started creating their independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). The establishment 
of IRAs became necessary, specifically after the market's liberalization, to ensure effective telecom 
markets by overseeing the incumbent behavior and serving as a credible safeguard for investors. For 
instance, some Latin American countries created their IRAs in the 1980s, such as those established in 
Argentina and Brazil, among others. For the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, the 
adoption of telecom reforms was delayed; the first independent regulatory authority was established in 
Jordan in 1995. The adoption of telecom reforms in the MENA region took place mostly after their 
participation in the General Agreement on Trade in Services “GATS”2 had occurred. MENA countries 
also differ in their degrees of reform adoption: some are adopting telecom reforms; others, as was the 
case with most of the GCC countries, lagged in adopting such reforms. Such differences would help us 
to test the effect of different telecom reforms on the sector's performance. 
The specificity of the MENA region is emphasized by the challenges faced by different MENA 
countries. Among those challenges are structural reforms, including reforming inefficient regulatory 
frameworks and the inadequate provisioning of infrastructure services. The absence of significant 
economic reforms and persistent political and macroeconomic instability is likely to keep investment 
and growth below its potential in developing the MENA region, in the short run as well as in the 
upcoming future, unless there is a break with past practices (World Bank 2013). Moreover, the region's 
persistent political instability has affected the investments in a negative manner by skewing them 
                                                 
2 GATS is an international trade agreement in the context of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The GATS aims to remove 
gradually all barriers to trade in services. 
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toward the activities that create the fewest jobs. It is important to carry out reforms that are designed to 
overhaul the developmental paradigm. Another challenge faced by the MENA region is the adoption of 
an economic integration and reform program while taking into account the institutional features of such 
countries. The importance of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) agreement notwithstanding, 
the MENA countries still need to go further and adopt an agreement including all MENA countries, 
which would be a measure serving to help wider and deeper integration among them. 
Thus, among the most effective ways to develop a long-term strategy for better growth and 
employment for the MENA region is to create a competitive private environment to promote the FDI 
inflows and portfolio flows at the global level—particularly in the services sector. The MENA region's 
economic growth is likely to happen by addressing competition, privatization, regional integration, 
openness of new markets, and filling infrastructure gaps, among other approaches. In spite of the 
relative openness of the telecom sector, generally, to competition, the MENA region lagged in adopting 
reforms compared to other countries. Moreover, up until now, the MENA countries are still functioning 
below their potentials with respect to telecom market liberalization, which affects ICT development and 
the overall growth rate. The liberalization of services between the MENA countries is a measure that 
could help to facilitate further integration. Such liberalization would remove intra-regional services 
barriers and would facilitate more trade liberalization and higher economic growth via greater regional 
integration. 
Therefore, the political, economic and institutional characteristics of the MENA countries shape their 
decisions in adopting reforms. To better understand the determinants of the telecom reforms, it is crucial 
to take into account the institutional and political framework for the MENA countries. It is noteworthy 
that, even after introducing different telecom reforms since 1995, not all MENA countries became better 
off in terms of different performance indicators
3
. Although the MENA countries outperformed Latin 
American and East Asian and Pacific countries in 1995 in terms of their fixed-line penetration, they 
showed more limited development and lagged behind them in 2011, which is not the case for mobile 
penetration. Hence, does the adoption of reforms in the MENA region improve or worsen the sector's 
performance? It is important to test the relationship between different telecom reforms and the sector's 
performance, given the economic, political and institutional characteristics of the MENA countries. 
During this last decade, telecommunication reforms in developing countries have been heavily 
explored (Boylaud and Nicoletti 2000; Fink et al. 2001; Wallsten 2001; Fink et al. 2003; Estache et al. 
2006; Gasmi et al. 2013). Although the MENA region is politically relevant, especially for Europe, the 
literature that focuses on the MENA countries is indeed scarce. No econometric study has explored the 
impact of telecom reforms on the sector's performance in the MENA countries
4
. Previous studies have 
been dedicated to Asian or Latin American countries that started reforming their sectors somewhat 
before the MENA countries. The slow pace of economic reforms and the lack of response of domestic 
and foreign investment to economic reform over the past two decades have thus been serious causes for 
concern for the MENA countries (Karshenas 1994). Because the MENA region lacks studies, 
specifically empirical studies, on the importance of telecom reforms and telecom service liberalization, 
despite being a sector vital in its contributions to economic and social development; our study is 
important for policymakers seeking to be aware of different gains and limits with regard to the effects of 
reforms and liberalization. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, other than the study by Gual and 
Trillas (2006)
5
 that takes into account the cross-sectional data on institutional endowment for 37 
countries  (3 MENA countries included), we can barely find studies that account for the countries’ 
institutional characteristics. In this study, we assess whether imposing telecom reforms depends on the 
institutional, political and economic nature of such countries, or if the reforms are only due to pressures 
from the IMF and the WB, regardless the countries specificities. Accordingly, we are looking forward to 
focusing on original and non-traditional determinants of the adoption of reforms that have somehow 
tended to be overlooked in previous studies; such determinants will be used as instruments for different 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix and Table 2. 
4 Rossotto et al. (2005) state that the market liberalization in the MENA region has been slower than elsewhere in the developing world. They 
develop an indicator of market openness that encompasses elements of competition, openness to FDI and regulatory independence for the 
MENA region. However, the empirical evidence they provide is not specific to MENA countries. 
5 They collected a number of political variables on the general quality of the government, interest groups, ideologies, institutions and traditions 
of each country with regard to the state’s involvement in the economy. 
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reforms. We principally use the level of democracy, the legal origin, the natural resources rents per 
country while controlling for the year of independence from colonization for each country. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to develop an empirical analysis for 17 MENA countries
6
 from 1995-
2010 to explore the impact of telecom reforms, as well as the simultaneous presence of different reforms 
on telecom performance in the voice market for the fixed and the mobile segments. For instance, does 
the simultaneous adoption of privatization and market liberalization help to improve the sector's 
performance? Does the simultaneous establishment of an IRA with privatization or market liberalization 
matter for better sector performance? Finally, does the simultaneous presence of the three reforms help 
to improve MENA telecom performance? The starting date of the study was chosen according to the 
beginning of the adoption of most of the telecom reforms in the MENA countries, and also according to 
the availability of data. Namely, mobile services were introduced in the MENA countries in the late 
1990s. A study of the effect of reforms sequences on the sector's performance is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
As main results, we find that the privatization of the incumbent operator and fixed-line market 
liberalization lead to reduced access and higher prices. Moreover, we find that having an independent 
regulator, while privatizing the incumbent operator, helps to eliminate drawbacks of privatization with 
regard to the sector's performance. However, having an independent regulator, when liberalizing the 
telecom sector, does not help to improve the sector's performance. Furthermore, opening the fixed sector 
for competition, when allowing the privatization of the incumbent operator, also does not matter. 
Finally, implementing the three reforms simultaneously helps to increase mobile access, telecom 
productivity and fixed prices, but it decreases fixed-line penetration. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on the MENA region's telecom 
sector to emphasize the issues at stake. The literature review and the testable hypotheses derived from 
the literature are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides the data, the empirical model we adopt to 
test the hypotheses and the results. Section 5 presents a discussion of the different results. We end with 
concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Background and MENA telecom liberalization 
 
In this section, we aim to introduce MENA telecom reforms, as well as their level of telecom 
performance, to create an assessment before starting the empirical analysis. First, we introduce each 
telecom reform: regulation, privatization and liberalization, while describing the evolution of such 
reform in the case of the MENA region. 
 
2.1. The triptych of telecom reforms in the MENA region 
 
For the developing world, major reforms are introduced under pressure from the IMF and the WB in 
order to reschedule debt service payments or to solicit new loans in the contexts of new stabilization and 
adjustment agreements. These consist of moving towards greater trade liberalization, extensive 
liberalization of price controls and removal of government trading monopolies. Overall, the low 
performance of the telecom sector in the MENA region was not the only driver of adopting reforms; the 
conditions that guided the reforms were mostly political. Until 1995, the telecom sector in the MENA 
region suffered from the inertia of its traditional structure; the incumbent operator was mostly a state-
owned monopolistic operator
7
. Thus, the sector regulation was undertaken by the government with no 
independent regulator in place. The first independent regulatory authority—the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission (TRC)—was established in Jordan in 1995. (For a description of the IRA's 
                                                 
6 The countries included are as follows: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. We exclude Iraq, Iran and Palestine due to the lack of consistent data for 
many variables over the entire period. Also, we exclude Israel and Turkey because they are considered to be developed countries (OECD 
countries). 
7 Three MENA incumbents were private before 1995:  Batelco Bahrain was established in 1981, with Cable and Wireless taking a 40% stake; 
Etisalat Emirates was privatized in 1983 (the government took a 60% share in the company, whereas 40% is publicly traded) and finally, 
Sudatel Sudan was privatized in 1994 (the government owned 66.7%, and the private sector, 33.3%). 
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establishment, see Table 1.) Moreover, the incumbent operator was either regulated by the government 
and its ministers or it was self-regulated. 
 The first reform to be adopted by the group of MENA countries was the establishment of an 
independent regulatory authority
8
. Levy and Spiller (1994) state that regulatory independence is a 
necessary element for the regulator to be an effective institution and a credible safeguard for investors. 
According to Wallsten (2003), no matter what definition of independence is used, regulatory agencies 
will to some degree always be connected to the government. However, such separation reduces the 
probability of a regulatory capture, either by the government or by the operators. Hence, our focus in 
this paper would be to emphasize whether there exists an independent regulatory authority from its 
government or not. Actually, as shown in Table 1, 5 of the 17 MENA countries have no independent 
regulator. For Djibouti, Kuwait, and Yemen, the regulatory functions are the responsibility of the 
ministry of Communications. For Libya, the General Telecommunication Authority (GTA) has been the 
telecommunication regulatory body since 2006, but it was headed by the son of Libya’s former 
president. Finally, Syria's regulatory framework is the responsibility of the incumbent operator, the 
Syrian Telecommunication Establishment. 
 The second reform in the triptych concerns the privatization of the main incumbent operator. The 
move from state ownership to private ownership is usually regarded as a necessary condition for 
significant market liberalization (Parker and Saal 2003). According to the literature (Boycko et al. 1996; 
North 1990; Levy and Spiller 1996), the type of ownership affects firm behavior and performance, 
because the incentives faced by decision makers change according to the ownership type. For most of 
the MENA countries, the privatization of the incumbent operator started in approximately the late 1990s 
to the early 2000s. It is noteworthy that the privatization of the MENA region's telecom sector does not 
imply the loss of state control over the incumbent operator, because the state mostly maintained the 
largest share of the incumbent capital. As shown in Bortolotti et al. (2004), partial or incomplete sales 
are a common feature of the privatization process. For the MENA region, as of 2010, 10 of the 17 
MENA countries had started the process of the incumbent privatization; 9 of them have partially 
privatized, and only one is fully privatized (Jordan). It is worth noting that many studies, such as that by 
Estache et al. (2006), considered the commitment to privatization as a proxy for the commitment to 
liberalization. In fact, even if the existence of private telecommunication companies is necessary, it is 
not a sufficient condition for increased competition. For instance, in the context of the MENA region, 
the incumbent operator was privatized in Jordan in 2000, and then, the fixed-line market was liberalized 
in 2005 in compliance with its GATS commitments. For Morocco, the incumbent operator—Maroc 
Telecom—was first privatized in 2001 by selling 35% to Vivendi France, and then the fixed-line market 
was opened to Meditel and to Wana “Maroc Connect” in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Other countries 
introduced privatization of their incumbent operator but failed to foster competitive markets, as was the 
case in Egypt. The process of Telecom Egypt's privatization started in 2005. However, it remains 
incomplete because, in 2012, Telecom Egypt’s shares were 80% owned by the Egyptian Government, 
and 20% were in free float. Moreover, Egypt failed to foster a fixed competitive market. Thus, such 
privatization only creates a private monopoly. Hence, is it necessary to liberalize the market when 
allowing for the incumbent privatization? Would a competitive market limit the market power of a 
privatized monopoly? 
 The last telecom reform is market liberalization, which occurs by opening the sector for new 
operators. In this paper, we will focus on the competition that occurs in the provision of services, rather 
than the competition at the infrastructure level. Thus, we will study the effects of liberalization that 
occur in the service-based markets for the local fixed and mobile services. The liberalization framework 
is important because a monopoly, whether state-owned or privately owned, has fewer incentives to 
improve services and lower prices than a firm operating in a competitive environment. Even after the 
opening of the sector to competition, the incumbent Public Telecom Operator (PTO) still has a 
competitive advantage that can be exploited against new entrants because it has no incentive to share its 
network with new entrants or establish suitable interconnection terms. Consequently, when the 
government plays the role of regulator, as well as serves as the owner of the incumbent operator, even 
                                                 
8 The regulatory framework in MENA countries has received considerable attention also in the energy sector due to the relevant exchanges 
with Europe; see Cambini and Franzi (2013), and Cambini and Rubino (2014).  
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partially, the interconnection agreements would be in favor of the incumbent operator. As emphasized 
by Wallsten (2003), the incumbent operator can be a barrier to market liberalization. Hence, the solution 
is to have the simultaneous or prior presence of an IRA that would set the market rules and oversee the 
incumbent's behavior. For the MENA countries, in many cases specifically for the fixed-line market, 
potential entrants have been discouraged by the high set-up costs of establishing a new network. For 
example, Telecom Egypt has refused to lease its network to new market entrants, as was done by 
Morocco's incumbent in 2007 (Marouani and Munro 2009). Actually, competition in the MENA 
countries is greater in the mobile markets than in the fixed-line markets, which recently started to be 
liberalized. Moreover, even if the monopoly condition for the incumbent fixed operator has been lifted, 
there remain high barriers to entry, such as the cost of building a network, which requires sharing the 
incumbent's network with suitable interconnection terms. For many MENA countries, the fixed segment 
is still closed to competition, with 10 of 17 countries having a fixed monopoly market, which is not the 
case in the mobile market, where it is mostly competitive, as shown in Table 1. 
 
2.2. Telecom performance in the MENA region 
 
It is noteworthy that the MENA region differs compared with other developing regions, such as Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) regions, in terms of telecom 
reforms and performance. Moreover, there is some degree of heterogeneity between the MENA 
countries in terms of their adoption of reforms, as we mentioned in the previous subsection, as well as in 
terms of their levels of telecom performance, with higher level being observed in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC)
9
 countries. 
 In 1995, the MENA countries showed a modest fixed-line penetration, with an average of 10.2 lines 
per 100 inhabitants, compared to 44.8 for OECD countries. Except for some GCC countries, the 
remaining MENA countries suffered from significantly lower fixed-line penetration, where limited 
network expansion could be justified by the large geographic size and lower level of income compared 
to most GCC countries. For example, fixed-line penetration for North African countries was 
approximately 3.8 lines per 100 people. In the light of the technological developments in 
telecommunications in the world economy, the modest performance of the telecom sector in the MENA 
countries highlighted the need for adopting different reforms. Fixed and mobile penetration indicators 
for the MENA countries in 2011 are depicted in Table 2. Between 1995 and 2011, the MENA countries 
witnessed an increase in fixed-line penetration from an average of 11.49 to 12.7 lines per 100 
inhabitants, compared to 43.19 for OECD countries. This increase may be due either to a substitution 
effect between the fixed and mobile lines, to the development of mobile broadband compared with fixed 
broadband or to the dual-SIM effect. It is noteworthy that, although the LAC and EAP regions 
experienced modest fixed-line penetration in 1995 compared to the MENA countries, the evolution of 
their fixed-line penetrations in 2010 was much higher than for the MENA countries. There is no doubt 
that the telecom sector reforms carried out by the MENA countries, in terms of infrastructure 
investments and liberalization of the telecom markets, have affected network penetration, so it is crucial 
to explore the low level of fixed-line penetration witness in the MENA region compared with other, 
comparable regions. 
 Mobile services were introduced in the late 1990s, and their use has quickly expanded throughout the 
region. In most MENA markets, the market is oversaturated; 11 out of 17 countries have a mobile 
penetration rate of over 100%. The average mobile penetration rate for MENA countries is 112%, which 
is higher than all other rates in the LAC, EAP and OECD (104.7%, 83.2% and 106.6%, respectively). In 
GCC countries, the increasing use of mobile services has been accompanied by a decrease in fixed-line 
penetration, which could explain the drop in fixed-line penetration rates. This situation is not the case 
for the other MENA countries, which initially suffered from reduced fixed-line penetration and where 
the boom in mobile services has been accompanied by an increase in fixed-line penetration. 
 To conclude, in comparisons with other regions (e.g., LAC and EAP), the MENA countries have the 
highest mobile penetration, although the evolution of fixed-line penetration is limited. Hence, what are 
                                                 
9 The Gulf Cooperation Council “GCC” is composed of six countries; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. For instance, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have fixed-line penetration rates of over 20%. 
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the main reasons behind the limited evolution of fixed-line penetration for the MENA countries? Is the 
spectacular evolution in mobile penetration due to limited fixed performance? 
 After applying the different reforms on the group of MENA countries and exploring the unique 
evolution patterns for the MENA region's telecom performance, it is important to investigate the main 
reasons behind the low fixed-line penetration for MENA countries. Is the limited fixed-line penetration 
due to limited supply? Or is it due to excessive interconnection terms and high barriers to access the 
infrastructure set by the incumbent upon new entrants? Hence, it is important to test whether the telecom 
reforms adopted by MENA countries lessen those problems or if such reforms are just worsening 
MENA countries' telecom performance. In the context of the MENA countries, it is also worthy testing 
if such reforms are adapted to the economic, institutional and political characteristics of the MENA 
region. 
 
 
3. Related literature and testable hypotheses 
 
Our objective, in this section, is to analyze the relationship between the telecom reforms and the telecom 
performance for the MENA countries. Telecom reforms include regulation, privatization and 
liberalization, as well as their simultaneous presences, whereas telecom performance indicators include 
the three dimensions of access, affordability and productivity. In this section, we explore the existing 
literature to derive our testable hypotheses. 
 
3.1. Does the establishment of an IRA improve telecom performance? 
 
In the infrastructure industries, the importance of institutions, specifically for the developing countries, 
was mainly to address the underinvestment problem that occurs due to the sunk nature of the 
investments needed. Thus, having an independent regulator is considered to be a credible solution to 
alleviate the time inconsistency problem faced by investors (Trillas and Montoya 2011). The claim 
offered by politicians to justify the transfer of powers to a specific regulatory agency is that countries 
with independent regulators will achieve better policy outcomes than countries without independent 
regulators or that countries with more independent regulators will achieve better policy outcomes than 
countries with fewer independent regulators (Hanretty and Koop 2012). Although, in theory, other 
mechanisms could solve for the time inconsistency problem faced by regulators, the literature notes that 
it is difficult for developing countries to find credible alternative to an independent regulatory agency 
(Trillas and Montoya 2011). 
 The effect of the establishment of an independent regulator differs across empirical studies. Estache 
et al. (2006) use a sample of 204 countries to show that the introduction of an IRA helps to decrease the 
price of local calls and increase labor productivity. Surprisingly, the introduction of an IRA has no 
statistically significant impact on access or on the fixed component of the tariff paid by users. Ros 
(2003) finds that the existence of an independent regulator is positively associated with teledensity and 
operating efficiency in 20 Latin American countries. Gutiérrez (2003) constructs a regulatory 
independence index and finds that the higher the regulatory independence is, the higher the network 
deployment and telecommunications efficiency, when said model was applied to a sample of 22 Latin 
American countries. Others studies reach different results concerning the effect of the existence of an 
independent regulator. Wallsten (2003), using a large sample of 200 countries, finds that establishing an 
independent regulator is rarely and negatively significant and is correlated with the number of mainlines, 
mainlines per capita and investment, but it is correlated positively and significantly with the number of 
cellular subscribers. In their panel data analysis, Trillas and Montoya (2011) confirm that regulator 
independence is associated with higher network penetration, but the magnitude and statistical 
significance of this impact are low and difficult to assess. 
 It is quite clear that the impact of an independent regulator on the sector's performance is not 
consistent across the previous studies, which is mostly due to differences in the institutional, political 
and economic characteristics of the countries studied. Hence, to derive our first hypothesis, we rely on 
the theoretical role that the regulator should perform in order to be efficient. An independent regulator 
should ensure greater access for telecom users and higher sector productivity. However, an independent 
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regulator may induce a price increase after the entry of new competitors and the elimination of cross-
subsidization. Before the establishment of an IRA, retail tariffs were not rebalanced; however, after the 
introduction of the IRA, the regulator has to rebalance the tariffs, leading to an increase in prices. 
 
Hypothesis 1. An independent regulator improves the sector's performance in terms of access and 
productivity, but it leads to price increases. 
 
3.2.  Does ownership affect telecom performance? 
 
In spite of the importance of the state ownership to correct the market failure and to pursue nonprofit-
generating activities, a critical factor behind the privatization is the well-documented poor performance 
of public enterprises (Boycko et al. 1996). For the developing countries, the occurrence of privatization 
may be the expression of inefficient regulation, corruption or financial problems (Laffont 2005). In their 
article, Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) state that, in the case of private ownership, this corruption will 
take the form of higher prices. For them, although international agencies advised countries to open their 
infrastructure industries to the private sector to increase their investments and improve their efficiency, 
privatization has been disappointing for countries with the lowest income. These failures were 
accompanied by increases in prices, which have led to large dissatisfaction with privatization. 
 In the literature, the effect of privatization on performance is not consistent across different studies. 
For Ros (1999), privatization can have positive effects because managers will capture the benefits 
(either cost savings or profits) resulting from privatization. Thus, it increases managers’ incentives to 
reduce costs and to increase productivity. From another side, the privatization can have drawbacks. 
Privatized firms can increase their profitability by restricting output or by restricting nonprofit objectives 
as provision of universal service (Li and Xu 2004). Consequently, the existence of a regulator is 
important to deter privatized firms from such practices. Furthermore, the risk that the government may 
opportunistically decide to enforce low prices, without allowing the firm to recover the costs induced by 
large sunk investments, gives rise to the problem of underinvestment (Vickers and Yarrow 1991). Thus, 
the impact of privatizing the incumbent operator highly depends on the existence of an independent 
regulator. In Wallsten (2001), the privatization alone is associated with few benefits and is negatively 
correlated with mainline penetration and connection capacity. When it is combined with an independent 
regulator, it is positively correlated with telecom performance measures. So, the simultaneous presence 
of an IRA and a private incumbent helps to mitigate the negative effects of privatization on mainline 
penetration. 
 Moreover, private ownership becomes more efficient when there is effective competition (Gual and 
Trillas 2006). For Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009), the private ownership has not improved 
performance, notably in sectors where there is no competition. Empirically, Fink et al. (2001), in the 
context of 12 developing Asian economies over the period 1985-1999, show that privatization alone 
may not lead to great strides if the privatized monopoly is not exposed to competition. We also expect 
that, when a privatized monopoly is exposed to competition, this will mitigate the negative effects that 
could arise from privatizing the incumbent. 
 
Hypothesis 2. 
2.a. Privatization leads to higher prices and lower access. 
2.b. The presence of an independent regulator and a private incumbent simultaneously improves telecom 
performance. 
2.c. When a privatized incumbent is exposed to competition, this helps to improve telecom performance. 
 
3.3.  How does competition improve telecom performance? 
 
It is well known that competition between firms brings improvements in terms of allocative efficiency, 
as well as internal (technical) efficiency. Moreover, competition is crucial because it helps to avoid the 
problem of limited regulator capacity and serves as a pressure on the firm to keep prices low (Estache 
and Wren-Lewis 2009). Therefore, there is a general consensus that competition in the non-natural 
monopoly segments of telecommunications is beneficial for welfare through improvements in incentives 
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and productivity (Gual and Trillas 2006). In the following, we focus on service-based competition, 
rather than facility-based competition. 
Because the incumbents have the largest sunk investments in the infrastructure and are the main 
infrastructure providers for new entrants, they have a competitive advantage that can be exploited 
against them. To promote service-based competition, the regulator should guarantee access to the 
incumbent network by new entrants. As a result, interconnection agreements are a critical factor for 
making the competition viable in the market. An incumbent operator has no incentive to establish 
suitable interconnection terms to promote competition in the market in which it is a monopoly. So, the 
effect of competition on network expansion depends on whether the interconnection terms are suitable 
for promoting the entry of new competitors in the market or if they are in favor of the incumbent 
operator, thereby being considered barriers to entry and leading to entry deterrence. We should then 
avoid any anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent such as setting excessive interconnection rates, 
refusing to make available adequate interconnection capacity or refusing to share its network. 
Here arises the importance of the regulator. To ensure effective competition in the market, the 
regulator should pave the way for effective market liberalization. Given the nature of the telecom sector, 
the existence of a regulator is important to prevent anticompetitive practices; by ensuring that the 
interconnection terms are well established, consumers have lower prices and investors have profits. 
Laffont (1998) argued that liberalization can proceed safely only to the extent that strong regulatory 
institutions are established. Accordingly, it is crucial to have an independent regulator when introducing 
competition. Even if competition is introduced, the regulator should reduce market power and set access 
prices. As explained by Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009), the experience in developing countries 
suggests that the regulation of partially competitive sectors can be as demanding on regulators as 
monopoly regulation. However, the regulatory capture by the incumbent should be avoided, because 
regulators are sometimes reluctant to introduce competition given that it has been considered an 
approach that destroys their rents from the historical operator. Finally, competition kills cross-subsidies 
(Laffont 1998); for this reason, the effect of competition on prices may be surprising. Laffont (1998) 
suggests a partial reintegration of cross-subsidies in developing countries that is not incompatible with 
introducing competition. 
To derive our hypothesis on the effect of competition, we assume that the regulator is effective. In 
other words, we assume that the incumbent operator doesn’t abuse its dominant position, the 
interconnection agreements are not excessive and regulatory capture is prevented, i.e., assuming that 
competition would improve the sector's performance in terms of access, productivity and affordability. 
 
Hypothesis 3. 
3.a. Competition leads to higher penetration and productivity, as well as to lower prices. 
3.b. The simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and introducing competition would lead to 
better sector performance. 
 
 
3.4. Do institutional, economic and political factors affect telecom reforms? 
 
Levy and Spiller (1994) draw attention to the impact of political and social institutions on the type of 
regulation that can be implemented. The authors show that the credibility and effectiveness of a 
regulatory framework and its ability to facilitate private investment vary with the country's political and 
social institutions. Thus, privatization in countries that lack the formal and informal institutions will 
require the development of alternative safeguards; thus, investors will not be reluctant to invest. In this 
subsection, we argue that institutional, economic and political factors explain the reforms adoption by 
the MENA countries. According to Ros (1999), the regulatory framework, affected by political and 
social institutions, determines in part  the success or failure of privatization. 
 First, we argue that the adoption of reforms is affected by the level of democracy established in 
each country. So, the intensity of the democracy indicator would affect different reforms adopted by the 
MENA countries, such as the establishment of an IRA, the attractiveness of private investments and 
market openness for potential entrants. According to Giuliano et al. (2012), democracy has a positive 
and significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms, but there is no evidence that economic 
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reforms will foster democracy. Theoretically, the economic theory does not give clear answer on 
whether democracy favors or hinders the economic reforms or if the relationship could go both ways 
(Giuliano et al. 2012). Empirically, only a few papers study the relationship between democracy and 
reforms. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) study the relationship between democracy and trade reform on 
140 countries from 1960 to 2000, and they find a positive relationship between democracy and trade 
reform. Similarly, Djankov and Amin (2009) findings confirm that an expansion of democratic rights 
encourages micro-economic reform from the World Bank’s Doing Business database and is likely to 
increase efficiency and growth. Quinn (2000) studies the relationship between international finance 
regulation and democracy and finds that democracies liberalize international finance. The level of 
democracy appears to be a valid instrument for telecom reforms because it can be treated as exogenous 
to our outcome variables; overall democracy is not likely to have a direct effect on telecom market 
performance other than through the adoption of reforms. Moreover, telecom reforms are sufficiently 
micro-measured; in this way, it is not possible that they would alter the level of democracy. 
 Legal origins, our second determinant for reforms adoption, were introduced in many countries 
through colonization. As discussed in a study by La Porta et al. (2008), the legal origin of a country is 
considered to be a style of social control of economic life, and such styles have developed, survived 
over the years and continued to have substantial economic consequences. Such styles prove its 
persistency in different countries and are very difficult to be altered. Furthermore, the historic origin of 
a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with 
economic outcomes (La Porta et al. 2008). Gual and Trillas (2006) consider the legal origin of each 
country to reflect its interventionist tradition and the degree to which the state has an inclination to 
intervene in economic matters. The effect of legal origin has been tested on different dimensions in the 
literature, among them financial development (La Porta et al. 2006), the government ownership of banks 
(La Porta et al. 2002), the government ownership of the media (Djankov et al. 2001) and the 
government ownership of labor markets (Botero et al. 2004). With a focus on the effect of legal origins 
on government regulation, La Porta et al. (2008) found that—for a broad range of activities—civil law 
countries are characterized by government ownerships, whereas common law countries are more likely 
to use private contracts. The authors conclude that common law countries have better investor 
protection, lighter government ownership and regulation, and more independent judicial systems, which 
are associated with more secure property rights. To summarize, legal rules protecting investors vary 
systemically among legal origins, with common law countries being more protective of outside 
investors than civil law countries. We argue, then, that the historic legal origin of each country affects a 
reform's adoption—specifically, the incumbent privatization and the market liberalization. Legal origins 
seem to be a valid instrument for telecom reforms because they are considered to be historic facts that 
are difficult to be altered. Obviously, telecom market performance could not shape the legal origins of 
each country; for these reasons, they are considered to be exogenous to telecom market reforms. 
 Another set of factors that would affect the reform adoption include natural resources; as an 
important source of rents for some MENA countries. Most MENA countries are known by their 
abundant natural resources, including oil, natural gas, coal, mineral resources and forests. According to 
the World Development Indicators (2013), the Arab World and MENA countries lead the world in 
natural resources rents. In fact, the motive for public ownership of incumbent operators has been that 
the government desires to keep control on the rents produced to exploit oil and other non-renewable 
natural resources (Goldstein 2002). Moreover, as already mentioned, major reforms are introduced 
under the pressures of the IMF and the WB in order to reschedule debt service payments or resort for 
new loans. Countries, independent in their resources, are then less forced to adopt reforms under such 
pressures. 
 Finally, we need to control for the year of independence from colonization for each country, which 
is also considered to be a historic factor that would affect the lags in the establishment of an 
independent regulator. Thus, the latter is the independence year, with reduced time available for the 
country to develop its national requisite institutions and rid itself of pre-independence institutions. 
 To sum up, it would be interesting to test the interplay between institutional, economic and political 
determinants and the adoption of telecom reforms to explain different factors leading to reform 
adoption. 
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Hypothesis 4. 
4.a. A more democratic country is more likely to adopt telecom reforms. 
4.b. A country with a civil law origin is less likely to adopt reforms—specifically, the incumbent 
privatization and the market liberalization. 
4.c. Countries are more reluctant to adopt different reforms when they have abundant natural resources. 
4.d. Latter is the independence year from colonization, more are the lags in reforms adoption. 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
4.1.  Instrumental variable estimation 
 
To test the effect of reforms on telecom performance, we estimate the following model by using IV-
2SLS estimation procedure (Instrumental Variable-Two Stages Least Squares estimation)
10
 while 
accounting for the endogeneity of reforms and while including year dummies
11
. We adopt a log-linear 
specification to transform different variables into a normal distribution. The regression takes the form: 
 
𝐘𝐢𝐭 =  𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐑𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟐𝐗𝐢𝐭 +  𝐙𝐭 +  𝛍𝐢𝐭 
 
Where  𝒀𝒊𝒕  is one of the three performance indicators we have chosen to consider, 𝑹𝒊𝒕 is a vector of 
reform variables and their interactions, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of control variables (GDP per capita and 
population density), 𝒁𝒕 are year dummies and  𝝁𝒊𝒕 is the disturbance term. An equation is estimated for 
each of the dependent variables we consider here. 
 It is obvious that the reform variables are endogenous, which means that they can affect one 
another and are also affected by different levels of performance. Typically, a low level of performance 
would be a motive for the government to establish an independent regulator in order to increase the 
sector's performance. Moreover, the actual level of demand, productivity and prices would shape the 
decision of new entrants to operate in the market. Additionally, the existence of an independent 
regulator in the market may be an important determinant for new investors, to serve as a guarantee that 
they would have profits in the long run and that they would not be harmed by anticompetitive behaviors. 
Furthermore, if the private investors are very interested in the performance indicators before going 
through the privatization process, the government may increase the efficiency of the incumbent 
operators in order to attract investors when introducing privatization (Gasmi et al. 2013). 
 To get the first stage results, we test the effect of the institutional, economic and political variables, 
used as instruments, on different reforms variables. Specifically, we model the decision to establish an 
independent regulator, privatize and foster competition, using an OLS model. The regressors principally 
respond to the democracy indicator, the legal origin, the natural resources rents as a % of GDP and the 
independence year from colonization, plus the exogenous variable we use in the second stage equation 
(such as population density, GDP per capita and year dummies). 
 
4.2. Data12 
 
The previous hypotheses, mentioned in section (3), will be tested using a panel dataset of the 17 MENA 
countries from 1995 to 2010. We construct our original database from various sources, as detailed in 
this section. Moreover, we are focusing only on the voice market for the fixed and mobile segments
13
. 
                                                 
10 Even if our endogenous variables are discrete variables, the consistency of IV-2SLS does not require the endogenous variables to be 
continuous  (Heckman and Robb 1985). Using the logit model in the first stage is unnecessary, because in 2SLS estimation, the consistency of 
the estimates in the second stage is not dependent on the correct functional form in the first stage. Moreover, performing the 2SLS's step-by-
step procedure leads to inconsistent standard errors because it does not take into account, in the second stage, that the endogenous variables 
were predicted in a previous step. 
11 We do not use fixed-effects estimation. Because that approach does not allow for the estimation of time-invariant effects, such variables are 
dropped from the estimation process. In our sample, we have some time-invariant variables whose effects would be lost in the fixed-effects 
estimation. Fixed effects methods are useless for estimating the effects of variables that do not change over time. Fixed effects and first-
differencing methods can lead to imprecise estimates in cases where the key variables in Xt do not vary much over time (Wooldridge 2010). 
12 See Table 3 for the variables list and Table 4 for the summary statistics. 
13 The data services market is outside the scope of this paper. 
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To assess the performance, we use three different dimensions: access rates, productivity and 
affordability of services, as used by Estache et al. (2006). We use different proxy variables to reflect 
those dimensions. To reflect access rates, we use as dependent variables fixed and mobile penetration 
(the number of fixed and mobile telephone lines in a country per 100 inhabitants, transformed by the 
natural log).
14
 Productivity is measured by the number of telephone subscribers in fixed and mobile 
telephone per employee (employed by total full-time telecommunication employee)
15
. To measure 
affordability, we use prices indicators
16
 as the monthly subscription for residential telephone service in 
US$ as in Estache et al. (2006) and Gasmi et al. (2013), and the price of a 3-minute fixed telephone 
local call (off-peak rate) in US$ as was used by Wallsten (2001), Li and Xu (2004) and Estache et al. 
(2006). We also use mobile price of 3-minute local call (off-peak) in US$ to reflect mobile affordability 
as in Gasmi et al. (2013), but at the peak rate. Thus, the data we use are the best data available to date. 
The data on the performance indicators come from the ITU database. 
To measure the effect of regulation, we use a dummy variable that equals 1 if an independent 
regulatory authority exists in a country in a specific year. The creation of an IRA per country is 
documented in the ITU World Telecommunication Regulatory Reports 2012, “Does a separate 
Regulatory Authority exist for Telecommunication or Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) in your country?”17 This measure doesn’t reflect the degree of independence, but it is the only 
measure available we can rely on due to the lack of detailed information on the regulatory functions for 
a long period of time
18
. As a consequence, interpreting its effect in a regression is related to attempts at 
regulatory reform rather than the effect of being an independent entity (Wallsten 2001). We collect data 
for regulation from the ITU database and different regulators' websites. Another dummy variable is 
constructed for privatization
19
. This variable takes the value of 1 starting from the year when any part of 
the fixed incumbent operator was privatized. If it is only transformed into a Joint Stock company, this 
does not imply its privatization because, in most the cases in the MENA countries, it remains a state-
owned company. The data are collected from the ITU website, incumbent operators’ websites and the 
Ministries of Communications websites in each country. To measure the effect of competition, we 
collect data on the number of fixed operators, as well as the number of mobile operators per country. 
Those numbers are based on the date in which the company started operating in the market, which is 
more reliable and reflects effective competition rather than the existence of licenses in a particular 
segment. We construct dummy variables for the competition in the fixed and the mobile segment. Then, 
to reflect the state of competition in the telecom market, we construct an index as in Li and Xu (2004); 
this index is constructed as follows: it equals 0 if a monopoly exists in both segments (fixed and 
mobile), it equals 1 if at least one segment operates with more than one operator, and it equals 2 if both 
segments become competitive. Data for competition come from the ITU website, different regulators 
and operators’ websites and the Ministries of Communications websites per country. 
To test the effect of the simultaneous presences of different reforms, we use three interaction 
variables to introduce different reform interactions
20
: regulation-privatization, privatization-fixed 
competition and competition-regulation. Then, we construct a three-way interaction variable
21
, 
regulation-privatization-competition. It is the product of the three reforms dummies, so it takes the 
values 0, 1 or 2. 
                                                 
14 This measure is used by different authors (Ros 1999; Ros 2003; Fink et al. 2001; Fink et al. 2003; Wallsten 2001; Li and Xu 2004; Gual and 
Trillas 2006; Gasmi et al. 2013; Trillas and Montoya 2011). 
15 This measure is used in different studies (Ros 1999; Ros 2003; Gutiérrez 2003; Li and Xu 2004; Gual and Trillas 2006; Gasmi et al. 2013). 
We use this method to measure productivity, because we do not have the number of telecom employees per segment. We find that dividing the 
number of mainlines by the number of staff employed by telecom operators is not reliable, as used in (Ros 1999; Ros 2003; Fink et al. 2001; 
Fink et al. 2003; Wallsten 2001; Li and Xu 2004; Gual and Trillas 2006; Gasmi et al. 2013; Trillas and Montoya 2011). 
16 Given by the ITU Database (2011). 
17 In this survey, ITU defines separate as “independent” in terms of finance, structure, and decision making from the operator(s) and the sector's 
Ministry. 
18 We prefer to construct an index to reflect regulatory powers and functions, but limited published information for the whole period prevent us 
from doing so because we have only one year per country data. As stated by Wallsten (2001), "Acquiring such information—especially for 
developing countries—is a Herculean task". We will correct for this limitation by having a two-stage estimation procedure. 
19 We use a dummy variable due to the lack of data on the percentage of privatization of the incumbent operator. 
20 Working with 86 developing countries, Fink et al. (2003) test the effect of the existence of an independent regulatory authority only when 
combined with other reforms. They find that complete liberalization pays off and positively affects teledensity and labor productivity. 
21 Fink et al. (2001) find a positive contribution of liberal policy (measured by a three-way interaction term) to the performance of 
telecommunication services in 12 developing countries in Asia. 
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 In our model, we control for demographic and macroeconomic variables, such as GDP per capita as 
a determinant of demand and population density as a determinant of the market size.  These data come 
from the World Development Indicators “WDI” database, as provided by the World Bank. Additionally, 
we include year dummies to measure time fixed-effects. 
 Finally, to correct for the possible endogeneity of reforms variables, first, we use the Polity IV 
Project’s political regime indicator for democracy as a political variable. It ranges from -10, fully 
institutionalized autocracy, to +10, fully institutionalized democracy. These data are available at the 
Center for Systemic Peace Web site “Polity IV”. Then, we normalize the variable to be in the range 
from 0 to 1. Then, to take into account the legal origin for each country (either civil law or common 
law), we collect data from the CIA World Factbook on the legal origin. We construct a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the country has a civil legal origin, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we use the total 
natural resources rents (% of GDP) to reflect the country's natural resources potentially leading to rents. 
These data come from the WDI database created by the World Bank. Finally, we collect data about the 
year of independence from colonization for each MENA country from the CIA World Factbook data. 
 
 
4.3. Results22 and robustness checks 
 
4.3.1. First-stage estimation findings23 
 
In our first-stage regression in Table 8, most of our results are in line with the theory (hypothesis 4); 
only hypothesis (4.a) is not validated. For the democracy effect on the adoption of reforms, our results 
show the absence of a relationship between democracy and the establishment of an independent 
regulator and a negative relationship between democracy and the other reforms (in terms of the 
privatization process and the introduction of competition). This result reflects the fact that democracy is 
not well established in MENA countries. In other words, depending on the political nature of a 
particular MENA country, it may not benefit from the otherwise positive impacts of establishing a 
democracy. Additionally, as noted by La Porta et al. (2008), we find that a civil law country is less 
likely to adopt telecom reforms specifically—i.e., adopt the privatization process and the introduction of 
competition—than is a common law country. This result confirms the fact that civil law countries are 
subject to government ownership, whereas common law countries are more likely to use private 
contracts. Moreover, we find that, when the country is somehow independent in its resources (i.e., high 
in natural resources rents as percentage of GDP), it is not compelled or forced to adopt different reforms 
under IMF and WB recommendations. Finally, the later the country achieved its independence from 
colonization was, the more it is delayed in establishing an independent regulatory institution, which 
implies greater delays in the adoption of reforms, thus describing a long-term negative impact of 
colonization on the adoption of reforms. 
 
4.3.2. IV-2SLS estimation findings 
 
Table 9 shows the estimations for the regressions of different performance indicators on our three 
reform-related variables. We also estimate the effect of competition on the fixed-line market, as well as 
on the mobile market separately.
24
 The results show that establishing an independent regulator has a 
positive effect on telecom access and that it helps to increase telecom productivity. Moreover, it leads to 
a price increase in the fixed sector measured by the residential monthly subscription. Such an increase 
can be explained by the tariff rebalancing system
25
 and the elimination of cross-subsidization. Hence, 
our results on the effect of the establishment of an independent regulator on the sector’s performance 
                                                 
22 See Table 5 and Table 6 for the OLS fixed-effects estimations. 
23 To ensure the validity of our instruments, we test the effect of each IV, as well as the control variables and the year dummies, on each 
performance indicator to confirm that our institutional and political variables are not directly correlated with the performance indicators. See 
Table 7 for the estimations. We find that they have an insignificant effect on our different performance indicators, except the year of 
independence, which affects fixed-line penetration negatively. 
24 We estimate the separate effect to avoid having more than one endogenous variable in the same equation. 
25 Tariff rebalancing seeks to increase access prices and reduce prices for services that have traditionally subsidized low access prices. The 
objective is to ensure that the price for each service reflects the underlying cost of providing that service. It typically takes place when ending 
direct subsidies as part of most reforms. 
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confirms hypothesis (1). Then, we find that the privatization has a negative significant effect on fixed 
access; however, it has a positive effect on the productivity measure. Privatization increases fixed prices 
in terms of the monthly residential subscription and the 3-minute fixed call, which validates our 
hypothesis (2.a). The third reform variable, competition, leads to lower access and higher prices in the 
fixed segment. However, in the mobile segment, competition helps to reduce prices, with no effect on 
mobile access. Moreover, competition has no effect on the productivity measures for either sector. The 
results related to the competition variable fail to confirm our hypothesis (3.a). 
 Table 10 shows the interaction results of the reforms (i.e., regulation-privatization, fixed 
competition-privatization, regulation-competition and, finally, their three-way interaction). When we 
take the interaction terms into consideration in the regression, this affects our performance indicators. 
For instance, when an independent regulator and a private incumbent exist simultaneously, this helps to 
improve the sector’s performance by eliminating the negative effect of privatization on fixed access. 
Although privatization increases prices in terms of fixed residential subscriptions—which ensures the 
tariff rebalancing system—such an increase is so large that it can be attenuated when there is a regulator 
in place. However, an independent regulator eliminates the negative effect of a privatized incumbent on 
the 3-minute fixed call and induces a price increase. This negative effect on prices may be considered 
predatory pricing, which deters other entrants from operating in the market. However, such behavior is 
avoided by the independent regulator. These effects confirm our hypothesis (2.b). 
 When we take into consideration the interaction between the incumbent’s privatization and fixed 
competition, we find that this interaction has no significant effects on most of the performance 
indicators. This interaction has a positive effect only on fixed affordability; this implies that the 
effective fixed competition does not help to reduce the negative effect of privatization on access and 
affordability. Thus, hypothesis (2.c) is not validated. 
 Finally, the simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and the introduction of competition 
has no effect on telecom access. However, it has a negative effect on productivity; the independent 
regulator’s effect on productivity is reduced the more competitive the market becomes. This 
phenomenon can be due to some regulatory constraints on the new entrants or due to the need to 
improve regulatory efficiency in the market in terms of setting suitable interconnection terms, adopting 
greater transparency in the licensing process and avoiding regulatory capture by the incumbent operator. 
When we test the partial effect of competition on fixed prices, we find that—within a competitive 
telecom market – an IRA would eliminate the negative effect of competition on residential prices and 
turn it into a small positive effect due to the tariff rebalancing system. However, an IRA does not 
eliminate the negative effect of competition on the 3-minute fixed prices, although it does reduce that 
effect. This phenomenon may attenuate large decreases in prices that would be considered 
anticompetitive behaviors. These results do not validate our hypothesis (3.b). 
 When we take into account the three-way interaction between the three reform variables—the 
establishment of an independent regulator, the privatization of the incumbent operator and the 
introduction of competition—we find that the simultaneous implementation of the three reforms helps to 
increase mobile access and telecom productivity. However, a negative effect on the fixed access 
remains. Additionally, this interaction has a positive effect on fixed prices, which means that, in the end, 
it is also important to offer incentives to foreign investors and new entrants to operate in the market with 
high—but not excessive—prices, to allow high profits. However, this interaction has no effect on 
mobile prices, which are determined by market forces in almost all countries. 
 
4.3.3. Robustness Checks 
 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we take into consideration the fact that different telecom 
reforms in year T would affect different telecom performance indicators at year T+1 instead of year T. 
So, we test the effect of different reforms, as well as their interactions, at year T on different 
performance indicators at year T+1, using IV-2SLS estimation (see Table 11 and Table 12). The results 
for different telecom reforms, as well as for their different interactions, are totally robust, although they 
sometimes show different levels of significance. Moreover, our models are also robust in terms of 
magnitude and coefficients for the inclusion of the time trend instead of the year dummies, except for 
the competition effect on telecom performance (i.e., its effect on telecom access is no long significant); 
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however, it is still robust for the separate effects of fixed competition and mobile competition. Finally, 
we test the effects of the various reforms simultaneously in the same equation, and we find that the 
coefficients are still robust in terms of significance but with different magnitudes, although this 
robustness does not apply to the competition variable. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The results on the impact of an IRA on the sector’s performance in the MENA region should be 
considered carefully because the IRA dummy variable does not measure the extent of regulatory 
independence even if it has claimed to be independent according to ITU reports. In general, the 
existence of an independent regulator is only efficient when it has powers, credibility and competences 
(Spiller 1993; Gilardi 2005; Hanretty and Koop 2012). Thus, the regulator has to be given all the 
conditions necessary to work effectively, in a way that guarantees its transparency and accountability. 
Despite the positive effects of the independent regulator on the different performance indicators when 
its effect is tested separately, the simultaneous presence of an IRA and market liberalization is found to 
be inefficient when taking into account the institutional and political contexts of the MENA countries. 
In other words, an IRA is not efficient at achieving telecom market liberalization. In other terms, new 
entrants may have no incentives to operate in the market. Hence, an IRA should be more effective by 
setting suitable interconnection terms, avoiding regulatory capture by the incumbent that would prevent 
competitors from entering the market, guaranteeing more transparency in the licensing process and 
ensuring that the incumbent would share its network with new market entrants. Thus, the establishment 
of an independent regulator is a necessary condition to improve sector performance rather than a 
sufficient condition for effective regulation. 
An incumbent’s privatization has many controversial implications on the sector’s performance in 
our regressions. The negative relationship between privatization and fixed-line penetration could be 
explained as a reverse-causation problem; when fixed-line penetration is very low, the marginal utility 
of privatizing the incumbent operator increases, which encourages governments to privatize. 
Additionally, investors may decide not to increase the number of subscribers unless it is profitable for 
them.  This implies that a privatized firm—specifically, a privatized monopoly—is able to increase its 
profitability by restricting output. Specifically, in the context of developing countries, there is a large 
need to invest in infrastructure, which would not be profitable for investors in the short term. So, this 
negative effect may be the result of ineffective regulation with no incentives to invest. Additionally, the 
positive effect of privatization on residential fixed prices implies that transforming a state-owned 
operator to a private one may not be constructive if it remains a monopolist. This may be due to the 
inefficiency of the regulator; hence we study the effect of privatization combined with an IRA. 
Concerning market liberalization, competition in the mobile segment improves the sector’s 
performance by decreasing mobile prices. However, the same is not the case for the fixed segment; 
having a competitive fixed-line market leads to lower access and higher prices, which may be due to the 
effect of tariff rebalancing. As a consequence, actual competitive reforms are not enough to improve the 
fixed sector’s performance. 
Obviously, the privatization of an incumbent operator combined with an IRA is important because, 
theoretically, a privatized incumbent can abuse its position by restricting output, by excessively 
increasing prices (specifically, the fixed monthly subscription) or by setting predatory prices, which 
requires regulatory intervention. Moreover, without an IRA, no privatized incumbent operator would 
allow competition because it would not be profitable for it, specifically when there is no competition 
authority that would oversee the incumbent behavior and induce competition in the market.
26
 
Accordingly, the simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and a private incumbent is not fully 
sufficient to eliminate the negative effects attached to privatization; however, such a simultaneous 
occurrence is necessary and needs to be more efficient. This result reflects the importance of 
institutions’ setting market rules, because a privatized incumbent can abuse its dominant position, which 
                                                 
26 The MENA competition authorities are not yet fully established. The MENA countries that have competition laws include Jordan, Lebanon, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. The countries that do not have competition authorities include Syria, Yemen, and 
Libya. 
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would have negative effects on new entrants, as well as on consumers. However, the results of the 
simultaneous presence of fixed competition and the privatization of the incumbent operator are very 
astonishing. Although the existence of other competitors in the market is considered a guarantee for 
consumers, the existence of competition does not eliminate the drawbacks of privatization. Therefore, 
more fixed competition is crucially needed in the fixed segment in the MENA region, while 
simultaneously improving the efficiency of the regulator in monitoring the market. In this way, the 
privatized incumbent could operate efficiently in the market in the presence of other competitors. 
The insignificant effect of the simultaneous presence of an IRA and market liberalization on fixed 
and mobile access implies that the regulator is not efficient for promoting competition in the market and 
that more rules are needed to guarantee its efficiency by setting suitable interconnection rules and by 
avoiding regulatory capture by the incumbent operator. An IRA’s stimulation of market liberalization is 
very crucial. First, an IRA has to encourage entry by ensuring that new entrants would be able to 
provide telecom services by accessing the incumbent’s networks through “third-party access” and then 
by assuring that they would earn profits. Second, it should make competition effective by lowering 
consumer prices. Hence, its role is crucial to ensure that operators and consumers are not adversely 
affected by liberalization. 
Last, having the three reforms occur simultaneously is not enough to eliminate the negative effect 
on the fixed sector’s penetration, although it has a positive effect on the mobile sector’s penetration. The 
remaining negative effect on the fixed sector’s penetration requires more explanation: the persistence of 
economies of scale in the fixed segment is considered to be a barrier that prevents competitors from 
competing in the facility-based market. On that account, having more firms operating in the service-
based market would require access to the incumbent’s fixed networks, which clearly requires suitable 
interconnection agreements. Thus, such negative effects can occur because governments are not paving 
the way for successful service-based competition. These negative effects may be due to unreasonable 
interconnection terms that prevent competitors from operating in the market, to the use of existing 
networks or to the need for a high level of investment in the fixed segment, such that many competitors 
could operate on the same network. In terms of institutional explanations, this negative effect can be due 
to regulatory capture by the incumbent operator. Moreover, the type of regulations in place matter; if the 
fixed segment is more regulated than the mobile segment, then once the incumbent operator is 
privatized, the investor will switch to the less-regulated and less-infrastructured segment, which would 
be more profitable for him. 
The previous results are of great importance to policymakers for adopting policies that suit the 
telecom market in MENA countries. For instance, policymakers could increase the level of competition 
in the fixed-line market without the need for a high level of investment by leasing the incumbent’s 
network. For instance, in Morocco, the incumbent has leased its network to new market entrants since 
2007. Another way to increase competition on the service-based level is by unbundling the incumbent’s 
network, as was the case in Bahrain. Although local loop unbundling becomes standard in most 
developed countries, its effect is not guaranteed for the MENA countries. However, testing the 
unbundling effect empirically for the MENA region is difficult due to the lack of data. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Overall, this paper is a first attempt to test the effect of telecom reforms on sector performance in the 
MENA region. The telecom reforms in the MENA countries, in terms of the establishment of an 
independent regulator, privatization and liberalization, have been much slower than in other regions. To 
account for the possible endogeneity of telecom reforms, we use IV-2SLS estimation by assuming that 
different reforms are affected by institutional, political and economic determinants. We find that the 
MENA countries truly suffer from the lack of independent regulatory institutions; this issue has greater 
implications for the fixed rather than the mobile market. Therefore, the main concern of policymakers 
should be the guarantee of an efficient and truly independent regulator. 
 Moreover, the effects of telecom reforms and their simultaneous implementation with regard to 
fixed access should be the focus of attention for policymakers. New rules should be put in place to 
ensure an effective telecom market, effective competition in the fixed segment and better monitoring of 
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newly privatized incumbents. Moreover, a regulator should guarantee the competitors’ access to the 
incumbent’s networks at reasonable terms, because the incumbent operator is controlling the fixed 
infrastructure. This guarantee is important to ensure the competition’s viability in the service-based 
market for the fixed and the mobile segments. 
 An interesting issue that needs to be addressed in further studies is the sequence with which the 
reforms are introduced in the telecom market for MENA countries. Does the prior existence of an 
independent regulator before the incumbent’s privatization and before the market’s liberalization matter 
for the telecom sector’s performance? Does an IRA represent a guarantee for new investors and entrants 
that would encourage them to enter the market? 
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Appendix. The effect of telecom reforms on telecom penetration 
Figure 1.1.  Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.3.  Figure 1.4 
 
Note. Figure 1.1.The effect of an independent regulator on fixed-line penetration three years before its 
establishment compared to three years after its establishment. Figure 1.2. The effect of the incumbent’s 
privatization on fixed-line penetration three years before its privatization compared to three years after 
its privatization. Figure 1.3. The effect of the fixed-line market’s liberalization on fixed-line penetration 
three years before its liberalization compared to three years after its liberalization. Figure 1.4. The effect 
of the mobile market’s liberalization on mobile penetration three years before its liberalization compared 
to three years after its liberalization. 
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Table 1. MENA telecom sector summary 2010 
 
Regulatory 
authority 
(creation year) 
Privatization of the 
main incumbent 
operator 
Competition level 
in the fixed-line 
telephone market 
Competition level 
in the mobile 
cellular market 
Algeria 2000 State-owned Monopoly 3 operators 
Bahrain 2002 Partially private More than 6 3 operators 
Djibouti 
No independent 
regulator 
State-owned Monopoly Monopoly 
Egypt 1998 Partially private Monopoly 3 operators 
Jordan 1995 Fully private 2 operators 3 operators 
Kuwait 
No independent 
regulator 
State-owned Monopoly 3 operators 
Lebanon 2002 State-owned Monopoly 
Government owned 
duopoly 
Libya 2006 State-owned Monopoly 
Government owned 
duopoly 
Morocco 1998 Privatized 3 operators 3 operators 
Oman 2002 Partially private 2 operators 2 operators 
Qatar 2004 Partially private Monopoly 2 operators 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2002 Partially private 2 operators 4 operators 
Sudan 1996 Partially private 2 operators 3 operators 
Syria 
No independent 
regulator 
State-owned Monopoly Controlled Duopoly 
Tunisia 2001 Partially private Monopoly 3 operators 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
2003 Partially private 2 operators 2 operators 
Yemen 
No independent  
regulator 
State-owned Monopoly 4 operators 
Note. Source: By the author from various sources, such as the ITU database, different regulators’ 
websites, incumbent operators’ websites and the websites of Ministries of Communication. 
 
Table 2. MENA telecom penetration 
Country Number of 
mainlines per 100 
people (1995) 
Number of mainlines 
per 100 people (2011) 
Number of cellular lines 
per 100 people (2011) 
MENA average 10.2 12.7 112.2 
Low & middle 
income 
6.6 10.81 92.73 
Latin America & 
Caribbean (all 
income levels) 
8.98 17.88 104.72 
East Asia & Pacific 
(all income levels) 
8.1 21.47 83.27 
OECD members 44.84 43.19 106.67 
Note. Source: World Development Indicators (2013) 
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Table 3 Variables list 
Variables Description Source of the data 
Dependent variables 
Access 
Log (the number of fixed lines in a country per 100 
inhabitants) 
The ITU database 
 
Log (the number of mobile lines in a country per 100 
inhabitants) 
The ITU database 
Productivity 
Log {the number of telephone subscribers for fixed-line 
and mobile telephones per employee (Total full-time 
telecommunication employees)} 
The ITU database 
Prices 
Log (the monthly subscription for residential telephone 
service) 
The ITU database 
 
Log (the price of a 3-minute fixed-line telephone local call 
(off-peak rate) in US$) 
The ITU database 
 
Log (the mobile price of 3-minute local (off-peak) in US$) The ITU database 
Reforms variables 
 
Regulation dummy variable 
ITU database and different 
regulators websites 
 
Privatization dummy variable 
By the author from ITU, incumbents 
operators’ websites and Ministries 
of communications websites per 
country 
 
Competition index 
By the author from ITU, different 
regulators and operators’ websites 
and Ministries of communications 
websites per country 
Control variables 
 
Log (GDP per capita) 
WDI (World Development 
Indicators), the World Bank 
 
Log (population density) 
WDI (World Development 
Indicators), the World Bank 
Instrumental Variables 
 
Polity IV Project’s political regime indicator for democracy 
The Center for Systemic Peace 
website (“Polity IV”) 
 
Legal origins—civil law or common—dummy variable The CIA World Factbook 
 
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
WDI (World Development 
Indicators), the World Bank 
 
The year of independence The CIA World Factbook 
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Table 4. Summary statistics 
  
Mean                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(Standard Deviation, Number of observations) 
Variable For the 
whole 
sample 
When                      
IRA = 0 
When                    
IRA = 1 
When 
Privatization= 
0 
When 
Privatization 
=1 
When 
Competition = 
0 
When          
Competition 
>= 1 
Access indicators 
Fixed per 100 inhabitants  12.84                  
(8.68, 272) 
13.23                   
(9.58, 143) 
12.41                   
(7.57, 129) 
10.7                         
(6.77, 166) 
16.20                   
(10.19, 106) 
13.13               
(9.51, 164) 
12.4                    
(7.26, 108) 
Mobile per 100 inhabitants 37.31                 
(45.24, 272) 
20.63                    
(34.87, 143) 
55.81                     
(48.27, 129) 
20.8                            
(34.4, 166) 
63.18                   
(48.18, 106) 
18.65                      
(30.6, 164) 
65.66               
(49.12,  108) 
Productivity indicator 
Total Lines (Fixed and Mobile) 
per Employee 
367.47              
(429.4, 217) 
155.94          
(193.28, 116) 
610.42             
(493.78, 101) 
171.26         
(203.51, 125) 
634.07             
(506.47, 92) 
92.16                     
(51.81, 137) 
687.82         
(514.78, 80) 
Affordability indicators 
Monthly subscription for 
residential telephone service  
5.96                   
(4.41, 235) 
6.08                         
(5.06, 122) 
5.84                     
(3.61, 113) 
5.87                        
(4.87, 137) 
6.089                  
(3.71, 98) 
6.21                      
(4.67, 146) 
5.56                    
(3.93, 89) 
Mobile cellular prepaid- price 
of 3-minute local call (off-peak, 
on-net) in US$ 
.39                            
(0.39, 213) 
.37                      
(0.47, 106) 
.41                     
(0.37, 107) 
.43                  
(0.502, 123) 
.34                             
(0.27, 90) 
.39                     
(0.37, 128) 
.401                        
(0.48, 85) 
Price of a 3-minute fixed 
telephone local call (off-peak 
rate) in US$ 
.057                         
(0.092, 228) 
.039                       
(0.054, 108) 
.074                       
(0.11, 120) 
.046                       
(0.062, 131) 
.073                
(0.119, 97) 
.0497              
(0.053, 128) 
.068                   
(0.124, 100) 
Note. Source: Own calculations from ITU database and collected data.              
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(Standard Deviation, Number of observations) 
Variable 
IRA* 
Privatizatio
n =0 
IRA* 
Privatizatio
n=1 
Fixed 
Competition * 
Privatization=
0 
Fixed 
Competition * 
Privatization=
1 
IRA*Compe
tition 
Index= 0 
IRA*Com
petition 
Index>= 1 
Three-way 
interaction 
= 0 
Three-way 
interaction 
>= 1 
Access indicators 
Fixed per 100 
inhabitants  
12.66                   
(8.66, 188) 
13.23                 
(8.75, 84) 
10.7                         
(6.77, 166) 
17.52                   
(10.5, 75) 
13.2               
(9.49, 187) 
11.67                   
(5.04, 51) 
12.8 
(9.1, 208) 
12.97 
(7.22, 64) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants 
21.38                    
(33.09, 188) 
72.97                     
(48.53, 84) 
20.8                            
(34.4, 166) 
49.52                   
(48.87, 75) 
22.85                      
(35.24, 187) 
53.1               
(42.39, 51) 
23.64 
(35.04, 208) 
81.76 
(46.34, 64) 
Productivity indicator 
Total lines (Fixed and 
Mobile) per Employee 
173.3          
(190.57, 
147) 
775.24             
(501.38, 70) 
171.26         
(203.51, 125) 
476.47             
(354.9, 71) 
191.7                     
(213.9, 150) 
590.12         
(372, 44) 
200.72 
(211.46, 
167) 
924.45 
(500.04, 50) 
Affordability indicators 
Monthly subscription for 
residential telephone 
service  
5.86                         
(4.7, 159) 
6.18                     
(3.75, 76) 
5.87                        
(4.87, 137) 
5.85                  
(3.42, 70) 
5.96                     
(4.64, 166) 
5.77                    
(3.4, 38) 
5.73 
(4.57, 179) 
6.71 
(3.83, 56) 
Mobile cellular prepaid-
price of 3-minute local 
call (off-peak, on-net) in 
US$ 
0.41                     
(0.47, 145) 
0.36                    
(0.29, 68) 
.43                  
(0.502, 123) 
0.31                             
(0.18, 69) 
0.4                    
(0.47, 146) 
.355                        
(0.2, 44) 
0.39
(0.45, 164) 
0.4 
(0.33, 49) 
Price of a 3-minute fixed 
telephone local call (off-
peak rate) in US$ 
.044                   
(0.06, 149) 
.084                       
(0.13, 79) 
.046                       
(0.062, 131) 
.069               
(0.13, 69) 
.044              
(0.52, 147) 
.086                   
(0.16, 50) 
0.045 
(0.06, 168) 
0.095 
(0.33, 49) 
Note. Source: Own calculations from the ITU database and collected data. 
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Table 5. OLS estimation “The separate effects of each reform variable” 
 
 
ACCESS  PRODUCTIVITY AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES  Fixed per 
100 
inhabitant
s (in log) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  
employee (in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak) (in log) 
Mobile price of 
3-minute local 
call (off-peak)  
(in log) 
IRA establishment -0.127** -0.601*** -0.154** -0.113 0.278** 0.112 
 (0.0549) (0.206) (0.0652) (0.0980) (0.138) (0.173) 
Population density  -0.687*** -1.454* 0.211 0.182 -2.963*** -1.631** 
 (0.216) (0.805) (0.291) (0.371) (0.918) (0.703) 
GDP per capita 0.305 2.542*** 1.451*** 0.771* -0.888 -1.287 
 (0.240) (0.925) (0.318) (0.427) (0.783) (0.823) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.468 0.866 0.937 0.103 0.236 0.112 
Note. Fixed effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates 
and fixed-effects estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not 
reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
       
Privatization -0.110* -0.0524 0.127* 0.213* 0.147 -0.407** 
 (0.0614) (0.230) (0.0766) (0.111) (0.146) (0.181) 
Population density -0.818*** -1.688** 0.208 0.234 -2.970*** -1.830*** 
 (0.218) (0.829) (0.298) (0.370) (0.929) (0.699) 
GDP per capita 0.301 2.641*** 1.369*** 0.720* -0.987 -1.300 
 (0.241) (0.942) (0.319) (0.425) (0.791) (0.809) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.463 0.861 0.936 0.114 0.222 0.135 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates 
and fixed-effects estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not 
reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Competition index -0.0819** 0.268** 0.0220 0.0963 0.0896 -0.0318 
 (0.0357) (0.134) (0.0476) (0.0649) (0.0996) (0.112) 
Population density -0.637*** -1.992** 0.0683 0.00717 -3.527*** -1.551** 
 (0.220) (0.827) (0.291) (0.376) (1.068) (0.719) 
GDP per capita 0.355 2.482*** 1.361*** 0.690 -1.243 -1.298 
 (0.242) (0.937) (0.322) (0.429) (0.857) (0.827) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.468 0.864 0.935 0.107 0.221 0.110 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates 
and fixed-effects estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not 
reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Fixed competition -0.131** -0.0225 -0.00604 0.209* 0.0193 -0.113 
 (0.0602) (0.225) (0.0827) (0.107) (0.164) (0.190) 
Population density  -0.681*** -1.645** 0.0816 0.0224 -3.110*** -1.513** 
 (0.216) (0.824) (0.291) (0.370) (1.062) (0.715) 
GDP per capita  0.321 2.640*** 1.370*** 0.706* -0.983 -1.268 
 (0.241) (0.942) (0.322) (0.425) (0.858) (0.826) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.466 0.861 0.935 0.114 0.217 0.111 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates 
and fixed-effects estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not 
reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Mobile competition -0.0831* 0.481** -0.0204 0.0266 0.0799 0.00162 
 (0.0501) (0.185) (0.0593) (0.0883) (0.128) (0.148) 
Population density  -0.663*** -2.146** 0.0908 0.103 -3.248*** -1.597** 
 (0.222) (0.827) (0.292) (0.379) (0.980) (0.716) 
GDP per capita  0.365 2.235** 1.385*** 0.737* -1.092 -1.328 
 (0.246) (0.940) (0.324) (0.435) (0.825) (0.831) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.462 0.865 0.935 0.097 0.219 0.109 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates 
and fixed-effects estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not 
reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6. OLS estimation “The effect of different reforms interactions” 
 
 ACCESS  PRODUCTIVITY AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES Fixed per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  employee 
(in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak rate) (in 
log) 
Mobile price 
of 3-minute 
local call (off-
peak) in US$ 
(in log) 
IRA establishment -0.0969 -0.220 -0.141* -0.0706 0.368** 0.338* 
 (0.0646) (0.237) (0.0774) (0.115) (0.161) (0.201) 
Privatization  -0.0387 1.235*** 0.245* 0.413** 0.454 0.150 
 (0.115) (0.434) (0.131) (0.196) (0.303) (0.340) 
IRA* Privatization  -0.0597 -1.335*** -0.102 -0.209 -0.376 -0.626* 
 (0.110) (0.413) (0.126) (0.188) (0.296) (0.321) 
Population density  -0.674*** 0.136 0.524 0.568 -2.250** -1.022 
 (0.257) (0.938) (0.344) (0.439) (1.055) (0.823) 
GDP per capita  0.340 2.968*** 1.515*** 0.828* -0.544 -0.898 
 (0.245) (0.917) (0.322) (0.432) (0.839) (0.826) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.474 0.872 0.939 0.129 0.247 0.158 
Note.  Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates and fixed-effects 
estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Privatization -0.104* 0.0141 0.0896 0.201* 0.151 -0.420** 
 (0.0610) (0.227) (0.0762) (0.110) (0.148) (0.183) 
Fixed competition 0.0780 1.642*** -0.721*** -0.113 -0.0266 0.0689 
 (0.154) (0.567) (0.203) (0.257) (0.337) (0.487) 
Fixed Competition * 
Privatization 
-0.242 -1.907*** 0.831*** 0.377 0.0853 -0.265 
 (0.162) (0.598) (0.208) (0.271) (0.364) (0.508) 
Population density -0.716*** -1.440* 0.0188 0.0811 -3.159*** -1.687** 
 (0.219) (0.824) (0.290) (0.372) (1.095) (0.715) 
GDP per capita  0.341 2.678*** 1.294*** 0.660 -1.103 -1.207 
 (0.239) (0.925) (0.307) (0.422) (0.874) (0.818) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.479 0.867 0.941 0.141 0.223 0.141 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates and fixed-effects 
estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
IRA establishment -0.0737 -0.793*** -0.158** -0.195* 0.252* 0.201 
 
(0.0580) (0.220) (0.0692) (0.102) (0.149) (0.182) 
Competition Index 0.124 -0.422 0.0502 -0.301 -0.0297 0.482 
 
(0.103) (0.387) (0.125) (0.182) (0.304) (0.331) 
IRA*Competition Index -0.207** 0.739* -0.0149 0.418** 0.0837 -0.538 
 
(0.101) (0.376) (0.124) (0.179) (0.299) (0.327) 
Population density -0.617*** -1.739** 0.197 0.110 -3.228*** -1.600** 
 (0.218) (0.809) (0.293) (0.375) (1.075) (0.719) 
GDP per capita 0.391 2.207** 1.444*** 0.652 -1.070 -1.094 
 (0.239) (0.917) (0.321) (0.424) (0.859) (0.833) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.487 0.872 0.937 0.138 0.238 0.126 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates and fixed-effects 
estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Three-way interaction -0.128*** -0.113 0.0973** 0.156** 0.0807 -0.149 
 
(0.0351) (0.134) (0.0490) (0.0637) (0.103) (0.113) 
Population density -0.575*** -1.510* 0.0252 -0.0841 -3.474*** -1.376* 
 
(0.216) (0.834) (0.288) (0.374) (1.074) (0.718) 
GDP per capita 0.410* 2.725*** 1.309*** 0.625 -1.233 -1.153 
 
(0.238) (0.946) (0.319) (0.426) (0.873) (0.828) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
R-squared 0.486 0.862 0.936 0.124 0.220 0.118 
Note. Fixed-effects OLS estimation. The Hausman test’s null hypothesis is rejected; the difference between random-effects estimates and fixed-effects 
estimates is systematic, and we should use the fixed-effects estimates. Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 7. Testing the validity of our instruments “OLS estimations” 
 
  Access Productivity Affordability 
VARIABLES Fixed per 
100 
inhabitants 
(in log) 
Mobile per 
100 
inhabitants 
(in log) 
Total 
number of 
Lines per  
employee (in 
log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call 
(off-peak 
rate) (in log) 
Mobile price 
of 3-minute 
local call 
(off-peak) in 
US$ (in log) 
       
Polity IV indicator 0.150 1.256 -1.578 -0.562 0.641 1.019* 
 
(0.455) (1.432) (1.043) (0.517) (0.533) (0.603) 
Population density 0.0306 0.0165 -0.0238 -0.0233 -0.125 0.0897 
 
(0.0806) (0.150) (0.0395) (0.133) (0.116) (0.0801) 
GDP per capita 0.655*** 1.046*** 0.0592 0.283** 0.341* 0.0588 
 
(0.0913) (0.167) (0.0769) (0.141) (0.193) (0.0955) 
Observations 250 245 202 215 183 193 
Number of country 17 17 16 16 14 17 
       
Independence year -0.0268*** -0.0116 -0.0189 0.00316 0.0158 0.00160 
 
(0.00691) (0.0114) (0.0131) (0.0277) (0.0144) (0.00899) 
Population density -0.00971 0.209* 0.0180 0.0353 -0.217* 0.118 
 
(0.0863) (0.112) (0.0843) (0.146) (0.120) (0.0851) 
GDP per capita 0.740*** 0.941*** 0.242** 0.276** 0.399** -0.0472 
 
(0.0924) (0.127) (0.117) (0.137) (0.185) (0.106) 
Observations 228 223 178 194 163 174 
Number of country 15 15 15 14 12 15 
       
Civil law 0.327 -0.0138 0.0439 0.535 0.0934 0.371** 
 
(0.200) (0.226) (0.230) (0.393) (0.438) (0.186) 
Population density 0.0708 0.193*** 0.00829 -0.0410 -0.0986 0.0540 
 
(0.0572) (0.0744) (0.0668) (0.100) (0.114) (0.0498) 
GDP per capita 0.630*** 0.926*** 0.196** 0.327*** 0.278 -0.00710 
 
(0.0921) (0.102) (0.0959) (0.112) (0.175) (0.0799) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
Number of country 17 17 17 16 14 17 
       
Total natural resources rents 
of (% of GDP) 
0.00120 -0.00653 -0.000763 -0.00684 -0.0144 -0.0105 
 
(0.00448) (0.0104) (0.00921) (0.00968) (0.0114) (0.0133) 
Population density 0.0418 0.161 0.00900 -0.0623 -0.174 0.00688 
 
(0.0880) (0.108) (0.0750) (0.135) (0.119) (0.0982) 
GDP per capita 0.641*** 0.972*** 0.189** 0.370*** 0.364** 0.0721 
 
(0.0893) (0.125) (0.0818) (0.134) (0.169) (0.165) 
Observations 260 255 207 225 193 202 
Number of country 17 17 17 16 14 17 
Note.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 8. First-stage estimation 
 
 
Parameters estimates for reform variables using OLS estimation 
Variables 
Establishment 
of an IRA 
Privatization of 
the incumbent 
operator 
Competition 
index 
Fixed 
Competition 
Polity IV indicator -0.213 -1.538*** -0.645* -0.359** 
 
(0.187) (0.140) (0.341) (0.156) 
Civil law --- -0.214*** -0.163* -0.0994** 
 
--- (0.0683) (0.0923) (0.0497) 
Total natural resources rents of (% of 
GDP) 
-0.0144*** -0.0186*** -0.00616* -0.00601*** 
 
(0.00187) (0.00243) (0.00367) (0.00211) 
Independence year -0.00763*** --- --- --- 
 
(0.00197) --- --- --- 
Population density in log -0.00728 -0.00574 0.0495 -0.00344 
 
(0.0248) (0.0217) (0.0314) (0.0167) 
GDP per capita in constant US$2000 in log 0.0598** 0.0967*** -0.0479 0.00743 
 
(0.0265) (0.0268) (0.0410) (0.0170) 
Constant 15.03*** 0.222 0.529 0.184 
 
(3.838) (0.221) (0.329) (0.147) 
 
    
Observations 218 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.396 0.450 0.426 0.303 
F-value 18.24 18.93 12.78 3.02 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses, including year dummies (not reported). Our results are robust when we 
exclude the control variables (population density and GDP per capita) from the estimation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 9. IV-2SLS estimation of the separate effects of each reform variable 
 
 
ACCESS  
PRODUCTIVIT
Y 
AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES  Fixed per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Mobile per 
100 
inhabitants 
(in log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  
employee (in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak) (in log) 
Mobile price 
of 3-minute 
local call (off-
peak)  (in log) 
IRA establishment 0.600*** 0.529* 1.124*** 1.278*** 0.0631 0.113 
 (0.129) (0.275) (0.224) (0.290) (0.300) (0.219) 
Population density  0.120*** 0.225*** 0.00284 -0.0309 -0.161** 0.191*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0679) (0.0538) (0.0499) (0.0713) (0.0499) 
GDP per capita 0.624*** 0.863*** 0.197*** 0.241*** 0.368*** -0.0876* 
 (0.0345) (0.0583) (0.0393) (0.0491) (0.0800) (0.0484) 
Observations 218 213 173 184 153 165 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", "total natural 
resources rents (% of GDP)" and “Independence year”.  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Privatization -0.247** 0.516** 0.913*** 0.573*** 0.655*** -0.176 
 (0.115) (0.255) (0.203) (0.211) (0.220) (0.189) 
Population density 0.173*** 0.159*** -0.0909*** -0.154*** -0.113*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0465) (0.0306) (0.0354) (0.0435) (0.0385) 
GDP per capita 0.606*** 0.844*** 0.0983*** 0.235*** 0.209*** -0.0349 
 (0.0277) (0.0531) (0.0355) (0.0461) (0.0537) (0.0398) 
Observations 250 245 202 215 183 193 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin 
dummy variable" and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Competition index -0.978* 1.117** -0.579 0.0321 -0.0390 -1.305** 
 (0.523) (0.496) (0.622) (0.382) (0.478) (0.542) 
Population density 0.222*** 0.117** 0.00965 -0.136*** -0.0837** 0.194*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0576) (0.0647) (0.0325) (0.0425) (0.0530) 
GDP per capita 0.546*** 0.932*** 0.153*** 0.288*** 0.264*** -0.0995* 
 (0.0420) (0.0540) (0.0332) (0.0427) (0.0567) (0.0553) 
Observations 250 245 202 215 183 193 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin 
dummy variable" and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Fixed competition -1.517** 2.040** 0.596 2.540** 2.371* -1.041 
 (0.674) (0.870) (0.736) (1.215) (1.278) (0.762) 
Population density  0.187*** 0.151** -0.0627 -0.195*** -0.138* 0.145*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0612) (0.0402) (0.0644) (0.0764) (0.0386) 
GDP per capita  0.573*** 0.904*** 0.184*** 0.306*** 0.193*** -0.0606 
 (0.0294) (0.0515) (0.0256) (0.0536) (0.0748) (0.0416) 
Observations 250 245 202 215 183 193 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin 
dummy variable" and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Mobile competition -0.314 0.664 -4.751 -2.113** -2.546* -1.974** 
 (0.696) (0.973) (5.890) (0.846) (1.510) (0.970) 
Population density  0.170*** 0.167*** 0.0890 -0.168*** -0.132* 0.149** 
 (0.0265) (0.0496) (0.187) (0.0534) (0.0753) (0.0592) 
GDP per capita  0.582*** 0.897*** 0.101 0.296*** 0.283*** -0.0789 
 (0.0305) (0.0485) (0.126) (0.0584) (0.0742) (0.0611) 
Observations 250 245 202 215 183 193 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin 
dummy variable" and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10.  IV-2SLS estimation of the effect of the interactions of different reforms 
 
 ACCESS  PRODUCTIVITY AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES Fixed per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  employee 
(in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak rate) (in 
log) 
Mobile price 
of 3-minute 
local call (off-
peak) in US$ 
(in log) 
IRA establishment 0.259 0.201 0.151 2.254*** -1.177** 1.032* 
 (0.613) (0.500) (0.843) (0.703) (0.532) (0.587) 
Privatization  -5.785*** -1.268 -2.824 5.972** -4.655* 4.024* 
 (1.992) (1.823) (2.301) (2.545) (2.742) (2.098) 
IRA* Privatization  6.318** 1.878 4.544 -7.597** 6.332* -5.577** 
 (2.488) (2.292) (3.483) (3.187) (3.301) (2.616) 
Population density  0.204 0.241** 0.00492 0.00116 -0.0801 0.166 
 (0.136) (0.0992) (0.125) (0.158) (0.164) (0.137) 
GDP per capita  1.128*** 0.973*** 0.482** -0.348 0.684*** -0.494** 
 (0.147) (0.159) (0.235) (0.295) (0.204) (0.234) 
Observations 218 213 173 184 153 165 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
Privatization 2.550 -0.395 -6.180 4.389 -2.081** 3.043 
 (3.353) (0.953) (8.842) (14.50) (0.812) (4.334) 
Fixed competition -15.18 -5.786 -38.90 -40.12 -17.26* 14.71 
 (14.45) (6.076) (50.22) (115.2) (9.382) (28.26) 
Fixed Competition * 
Privatization 
2.861 6.169 48.75 14.80 18.86** -20.28 
 (14.90) (5.840) (63.67) (109.6) (9.424) (32.19) 
Population density 0.190 0.191** -0.749 -0.0917 -0.852*** 0.527 
 (0.199) (0.0780) (1.106) (2.471) (0.240) (0.541) 
GDP per capita  0.287 0.869*** 0.945 -0.208 1.003*** -0.471 
 (0.321) (0.117) (1.160) (2.019) (0.259) (0.537) 
Observations 218 213 173 184 153 165 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy 
variable", "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization".  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
IRA establishment 1.245 0.911 3.021*** 0.337 -0.0794 0.636 
 
(0.891) (0.723) (1.132) (0.461) (0.500) (0.799) 
Competition Index -0.538 1.327 1.125 -1.756*** -3.048*** -1.381*** 
 
(0.779) (0.900) (0.820) (0.649) (0.792) (0.535) 
IRA*Competition Index -0.753 -0.750 -2.675* 1.807** 2.057* -0.0846 
 
(1.048) (0.977) (1.581) (0.814) (1.077) (1.061) 
Population density 0.177*** 0.143 0.125 -0.0345 -0.166** 0.248*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0916) (0.0951) (0.0532) (0.0812) (0.0779) 
GDP per capita 0.582*** 0.911*** 0.175** 0.237*** 0.276** -0.107 
 (0.0441) (0.0679) (0.0717) (0.0525) (0.127) (0.0701) 
Observations 218 213 173 184 153 165 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization".  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
Three-way interaction -0.378*** 0.503** 0.868*** 0.635*** 0.639*** -0.166 
 
(0.134) (0.229) (0.172) (0.202) (0.240) (0.192) 
Population density 0.195*** 0.206*** -0.0910 -0.109* -0.207** 0.209*** 
 
(0.0283) (0.0709) (0.0635) (0.0648) (0.0804) (0.0537) 
GDP per capita 0.574*** 0.854*** 0.179*** 0.247*** 0.316*** -0.101** 
 
(0.0265) (0.0550) (0.0367) (0.0497) (0.0864) (0.0479) 
Observations 218 213 173 184 153 165 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization".  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
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Table 11. Dynamic IV-2SLS estimation “The separate effects of each reform variable” 
 
 
 
ACCESS  PRODUCTIVITY AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES  Fixed per 100 
inhabitants 
(in log) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  
employee (in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak) (in log) 
Mobile price of 
3-minute local 
call (off-peak)  
(in log) 
IRA establishment 0.657*** 0.564** 1.212*** 1.241*** 0.0850 0.0492 
 (0.136) (0.272) (0.246) (0.310) (0.295) (0.221) 
Population density  0.108*** 0.219*** -0.00567 -0.0235 -0.156** 0.193*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0713) (0.0606) (0.0514) (0.0686) (0.0504) 
GDP per capita 0.619*** 0.833*** 0.203*** 0.249*** 0.350*** -0.0901* 
 (0.0361) (0.0597) (0.0425) (0.0493) (0.0766) (0.0494) 
Observations 205 203 159 172 149 158 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", "total natural resources rents (% 
of GDP)" and “Independence year”.  Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
       
Privatization -0.255** 0.327 1.046*** 0.592*** 0.726*** -0.137 
 (0.120) (0.262) (0.231) (0.224) (0.228) (0.192) 
Population density 0.170*** 0.152*** -0.113*** -0.156*** -0.133*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0493) (0.0331) (0.0377) (0.0468) (0.0387) 
GDP per capita 0.596*** 0.833*** 0.0804** 0.240*** 0.203*** -0.0325 
 (0.0279) (0.0521) (0.0401) (0.0479) (0.0565) (0.0397) 
Observations 235 233 186 201 177 184 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable" 
and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
       
Competition index -1.200* 0.805 -0.136 -0.140 -0.0152 -1.950* 
 (0.720) (0.623) (0.454) (0.408) (0.634) (1.092) 
Population density 0.247*** 0.109* -0.0408 -0.125*** -0.0914* 0.232*** 
 (0.0648) (0.0659) (0.0509) (0.0371) (0.0482) (0.0874) 
GDP per capita 0.518*** 0.897*** 0.168*** 0.290*** 0.267*** -0.136 
 (0.0552) (0.0560) (0.0263) (0.0443) (0.0594) (0.0851) 
Observations 235 233 186 201 177 184 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable" 
and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported..  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Fixed competition -1.766** 1.603 0.656 3.761** 4.951* -1.420 
 (0.875) (1.004) (0.672) (1.906) (2.867) (1.072) 
Population density  0.196*** 0.134** -0.0789** -0.247*** -0.240* 0.135*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0619) (0.0382) (0.0917) (0.127) (0.0402) 
GDP per capita  0.554*** 0.878*** 0.177*** 0.331*** 0.192* -0.0585 
 (0.0311) (0.0503) (0.0279) (0.0670) (0.106) (0.0451) 
Observations 235 233 186 201 177 184 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable" 
and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
       
Mobile competition -0.0449 -0.0286 -1.915 -2.819** -2.870* -1.294 
 (0.765) (1.344) (3.057) (1.214) (1.718) (1.096) 
Population density  0.156*** 0.173*** 0.00483 -0.156** -0.123 0.138** 
 (0.0323) (0.0660) (0.103) (0.0697) (0.0760) (0.0561) 
GDP per capita  0.576*** 0.856*** 0.146*** 0.296*** 0.269*** -0.0695 
 (0.0308) (0.0544) (0.0522) (0.0720) (0.0745) (0.0541) 
Observations 235 233 186 201 177 184 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable" 
and "total natural resources rents (% of GDP)". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 12.  Dynamic IV-2SLS estimation of the effect of the interactions of different reforms 
 
 ACCESS  PRODUCTIVITY AFFORDABILITY 
VARIABLES 
Fixed per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Mobile per 100 
inhabitants (in 
log) 
Total number of 
Lines per  employee 
(in log) 
Monthly 
subscription 
for 
residential 
telephone 
service 
Price of  3-
minute fixed 
local call (off-
peak rate) (in 
log) 
Mobile price 
of 3-minute 
local call (off-
peak) in US$ 
(in log) 
IRA establishment 0.310 0.369 0.300 2.544*** -1.464** 0.973 
 (0.633) (0.563) (0.872) (0.836) (0.597) (0.737) 
Privatization  -5.328*** -1.555 -2.458 6.058** -4.539** 4.347 
 (1.947) (1.871) (2.247) (2.547) (2.251) (2.710) 
IRA* Privatization  5.822** 1.966 4.283 -7.947** 6.550** -6.223* 
 (2.507) (2.485) (3.577) (3.269) (2.837) (3.649) 
Population density  0.201 0.240** -0.00383 0.000155 -0.0746 0.166 
 (0.135) (0.106) (0.129) (0.169) (0.182) (0.162) 
GDP per capita  1.106*** 0.974*** 0.474* -0.372 0.770*** -0.553* 
 (0.150) (0.164) (0.246) (0.309) (0.246) (0.299) 
Observations 205 203 159 172 149 158 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
Privatization 2.868 -0.382 -2.208 0.788 -1.690** 7.481 
 
(4.858) (1.290) (2.267) (11.90) (0.779) (19.78) 
Fixed competition -19.08 -7.308 -17.04 -40.65 -14.26* 24.71 
 
(18.14) (6.560) (13.81) (80.96) (7.870) (79.54) 
Fixed Competition * 
Privatization 
3.174 6.434 20.27 22.98 15.96** -44.42 
 
(18.29) (6.749) (16.18) (84.33) (7.958) (120.8) 
Population density 0.190 0.201** -0.346 -0.487 -0.741*** 0.959 
 
(0.256) (0.0823) (0.294) (2.025) (0.213) (2.183) 
GDP per capita  0.229 0.821*** 0.431 0.299 0.860*** -1.022 
 
(0.475) (0.145) (0.283) (1.678) (0.225) (2.382) 
Observations 205 203 159 172 149 158 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
IRA establishment 1.555 1.458 3.038*** 0.447 0.120 0.893 
 
(1.075) (1.138) (1.058) (0.529) (0.688) (1.876) 
Competition Index -0.114 1.199 0.937 -2.157*** -3.592*** -1.483** 
 
(0.819) (1.009) (0.809) (0.716) (0.999) (0.679) 
IRA*Competition Index -1.170 -1.387 -2.468* 1.836* 2.019 -0.414 
 
(1.286) (1.414) (1.395) (1.005) (1.377) (2.346) 
Population density 0.149* 0.156 0.117 -0.0137 -0.142 0.273** 
 
(0.0815) (0.103) (0.0983) (0.0537) (0.0970) (0.131) 
GDP per capita 0.588*** 0.864*** 0.208*** 0.237*** 0.253* -0.122 
 
(0.0480) (0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0573) (0.141) (0.0869) 
Observations 205 203 159 172 149 158 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
Three-way interaction -0.380*** 0.335 0.951*** 0.661*** 0.828*** -0.152 
 
(0.146) (0.257) (0.205) (0.221) (0.280) (0.237) 
Population density 0.189*** 0.220*** -0.103 -0.102 -0.227** 0.208*** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0727) (0.0654) (0.0676) (0.0917) (0.0564) 
GDP per capita 0.563*** 0.814*** 0.165*** 0.251*** 0.307*** -0.100** 
 
(0.0271) (0.0549) (0.0384) (0.0514) (0.0950) (0.0506) 
Observations 205 203 159 172 149 158 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables used as instruments are "The Polity IV democracy indicator", “Legal origin dummy variable", 
"total natural resources rents (% of GDP)" and "independence year from colonization". Year dummies and constant terms are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (...) means are not reported. 
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